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SEC Disciplinary
Under Rule 2(e)

Proceedings

Against

Attorneys

Congress has never expressly authorized the Securities and Exchange Commission to regulate or discipline attorneys. 1 Nevertheless, for more than thirty years the Commission has debarred2
certain attorneys from the practice of securities law through proceedings under rule 2(e) of its Rules of Practice.3 Before 1970, the Commission rarely initiated rule 2(e) proceedings against lawyers,
applying its sanctions primarily to attorneys whose conduct constituted particularly egregious violations of SEC rules or procedures.
Since 1970, however, the frequency of rule 2(e) proceedings against
attorneys has increased dramatically. The Commission has begun to
use the rule to coerce securities lawyers to monitor their clients' behavior more closely, thereby augmenting the limited resources of the
SEC staff. Commentators have severely criticized the expanded use
of rule 2(e)4 because it both chills effective representation of clients
and empowers the SEC to define the professional responsibilities of
attorneys - a function traditionally left to courts and bar associations. Although the Commission has not been entirely unresponsive
to these criticisms,5 it continues to assert its authority to punish seI. The Senate once considered a bill that would have granted authority to discipline attorneys to all administrative agencies. The Reform of Federal Regulation Act of 1979, S. 262,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(a) (1979), would have amended 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) to authorize
agencies to:
prohibit any individual from appearing before the agency or its responsible employees
whenever such individual refuses to adhere to reasonable standards of orderly and ethical
conduct, or continues, despite agency requests to the contrary, to engage in the deliberate
use of dilatory tactics, . . . or the repeated failure of the individual to be in attendance, or
to make witnesses available, when the presence of such individual or witnesses is necessary to the orderly progress of the proceeding.
Congress did not pass the bill.
2. The term "debar" is used in this note to disµnguish the limited nature of SEC sanctions:
the Commission debars attorneys from securities practice, but cannot disbar them from the
practice of law entirely.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1980).
4. See, e.g., Downing & Miller, The Distortion and Misuse of Rule 2(e), 54 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 774 (1979); Johnson, The Expanding Responsibilities ofAttorneys in Practice Before the
SEC: Disciplinary Proceedings Under Rule 2(e) ofthe Commission's Rules ofPractice, 25 MER·
CER L. REv. 637 (1974); Marsh, Rule 2(e) Proceedings, 35 Bus. LAW. 987 (1980).
5. In a recent decision, William R. Carter, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 22
SEC DOCKET 292 (Feb. 28, 1981), the Commission reversed an administrative law judge's
findings that two attorneys willfully violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by failing to
convince recalcitrant management to disclose material facts, and to report their views to the
board of directors after management refused to disclose. The administrative law judge had
suspended Carter and Johnson from SEC practice for periods of one year and nine months,
respectively. See William R. Carter, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,724, 17 SEC
DocKET 294 (1979). Ruling that the record did not support the administrative law judge's
findings, the Commission held that "[s]o long as a lawyer is acting in good faith and exerting
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curities lawyers who fail to conform to "generally recognized norms
of professional conduct."6
This Note reassesses SEC authority to discipline attorneys under
rule 2(e). Part I explores the history of rule 2(e) proceedings against
attorneys and the troublesome policy issues raised by the SEC's new
approach to rule 2(e) enforcement. Part II examines the SEC's claim
that general rulemaking provisions give it authority to discipline attorneys. The Note concludes that a proper construction of statutes
and case law bars rule 2(e) proceedings against attorneys.

I.

THE HISTORY OF RULE

2(e)

PROCEEDINGS

AGAINST ATTORNEYS

The Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated rule 2(e)
of its Rules of Practice less than a year after its creation by Congress
in 1934.7 The rule originally established an "S.E.C. Bar'' 8 by requiring that attorneys be admitted to practice before the Commission
and provided grounds for discipline of attorneys, accountants, and
other professionals practicing before the Commission. In 1938, the
Commission eliminated the admissions requirement, but retained
the disciplinary provisions. 9 The rule then provided that the Commission could deny the privilege of "appearing or practicing before it
in any way to any person who is found . . . (1) not to possess the
requisite qualifications to represent others; or (2) to be lacking in
character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper
professional conduct." 10
In practice, the Commission staff typically identifies an attorney
or accountant who it believes should be punished under rule 2(e),
and an administrative law judge then conducts a nonpublic hearing
on the matter. 11 The judge may then issue a ruling that temporarily
or permanently suspends the accountant's or attorney's right to practice before the Commission. A rule 2(e) suspension bars an attorney
not only from arguing before the Commission and preparing statements or papers to be filed with it, 12 but also from rendering any
reasonable efforts to prevent violations of the law by his client, his professional obligations
have been met." William R. Carter, 22 SEC DOCKET 323.
6. See William R. Carter, 22 SEC DOCKET 319.
7. The Commission was created by the Securities Exchange Act ,of 1934, ch. 404 § 4, 48
Stat. 881, 885 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1976)).
8. Rule Il(h), [1935] SEC ANN. REPT. 45-46. See William R. Carter, 22 SEC DOCKET 296.
9. Securities Act Release No. 1761 (June 27, 1938).
IO. See William R. Carter, 22 SEC DOCKET 297 n.17.
11. See Marsh, supra note 4, at 993-1005, for a detailed description of rule 2(e) procedures.
12. See rule 2(g), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(g) (1980), which states that "practicing before the
Commission" "shall include but shall not be limited to":
(1) transacting any business with the Commission; and (2) the preparation of any statement, opinion or other paper by any attorney, accountant, engineer or other expert, filed
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legal advice concerning the federal securities laws, .even to clients
who transact no business with the Commission. 13 A suspension may
be appealed to the full Commission, but appeals were rare until
quite recently. 14
Although legislation gives the Commission authority to employ a
variety of techniques to administer the securities laws - including
the power to investigate violations of the securities laws, to publish
information concerning such violations, 15 to bring actions in the
United States district courts to enj<;>in violations, 16 and to refer evidence to the Attorney General for criminal prosecutions 17 - no provision expressly authorizes the Commission to discipline attorneys. 18
The Commission, therefore, has had to justify rule 2(e) by reference
to general provisions in each of the securities statutes that authorize
the Commission to promulgate rules and regulations to implement
those statutes. 19
Until 1970, rule 2(e) proceedings were infrequent. During the
with the Commission in any registration statement, notification, application, report or
other document with the consent of such attorney, accountant, engineer, or other expert.
13. See, e.g., Richard D. Hodgin, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16,225, 18 SEC
DOCKET 458 (Sept. 27, 1979).
14. Attorneys must exhaust their administrative remedies within the Co=ission before
they can challenge rule 2(e) proceedings in the courts. See Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609
F.2d 570, 575 (2d Cir. 1979).
15. E.g., Stirling Homex Corp., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11,516, 7 SEC DOCKET 298 (July 2, 1975). Persons injured by such violations may bring a civil action for damages
under the Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1976), or the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976).
16. E.g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Universal Major
Indus. Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~95,229 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
affd., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977).
17. E.g., United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1972). Criminal penalties are
imposed under the Securities Act of 1933, § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1976) and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ft' (1976 & Supp. I 1977).
18. Only three unassociated provisions of the six principal federal securities laws mention
lawyers. The first reference occurs in the 1933 Securities Act. The Act requires registration
statements to include (1) ''the names and addresses of counsel who have passed on the legality
of the issue," and (2) "a copy of the opinion or opinions of counsel in respect to the legality of
the issue." Securities Act of 1933, Schedules A(23), A(29), 15 U.S.C. § 77aa, Schedules A(23),
A(29) (1976). Congressional hearings on the 1933 Act do not even mention these provisions.
See 1 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at xxvii-xxvili (1973). The second reference
similarly requires an opinion of counsel for an indenture to qualify under the Trust Indenture
Act of 1939. See Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 314(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77nnn(c)(2) (1976). The
third reference simply excludes lawyers who give investment advice as an incident to their
legal practice from the definition of "investment adviser" under the Investment Advisors Act
of 1940. See Investment Advisors Act of 1940, § 202(a)(ll)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 806-2(1l)(B)
(1976).
None of these references purports to authorize SEC regulation of securities lawyers. See
Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Rolefor Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437,
463 (1974); So=er,Professional Responsibility: How JJid We Gel Here?, 30 Bus. LAW. 95, 100
(Spec. ed. Mar. 1975).
19. See Marsh, supra note 4, at 1004-05.
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first fifteen years after the rule was promulgated, the Commission
employed rule 2(e) disciplinary proceedings only against accountants.20 During this period the Commission relied on other remedies
for attorney misconduct - injunctions from district courts where attorneys were violating the securities laws, and state bar association
disciplinary proceedings where the conduct violated attorney ethics
codes. It did not proceed against an attorney until 1950.21 Between
1950 and 1960, the Commission initiated four proceedings against
attorneys. In each case the attorney had intentionally misled the
Commission: one attorney prepared and filed materially misleading
documents, 22 another gave false testimony in an SEC investigation,23
a third filed a notification containing financial statements he knew to
be false, 24 and the last intentionally concealed information suggesting that an accountant who had certified a registration statement
was not independent.25 During the I 960s there were ten rule 2(e)
proceedings against lawyers, each involving intentional failure to
disclose material information to the Commission.26
In 1970 the SEC amended rule 2(e) to add a third ground for
debarment: willful violation or aiding or abetting a violation of the
federal securities laws.27 Since that amendment, the number of rule
2(e) proceedings against attorneys has increased substantially; more
than forty proceedings have been reported in the past ten years. 28
The variety of conduct punishable under rule 2(e) has expanded as
well. In the mid-1970s, the SEC began attacking lawyers for failing
to ensure that their clients made full disclosure. In several cases,
attorneys were temporarily suspended for failing to detect and pre20. The SEC is authorized to promulgate accounting standards. See Securities Act of
1933, § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1976). This provision may imply that Congress intended the
SEC to discipline accountants, justifying the result in Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570
(2d Cir. 1979), and distinguishing the use of rule 2(e) against accountants from its use against
attorneys. See, Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,982,
17 SEC DOCKET 1149, 1158-59 (July 2, 1979) (Karmel, Commr., dissenting).
21. See Albert J. Fleischman, 37 SEC 832 (1950).
22. Albert J. Fleischman, 37 SEC 832 (1950).
23. William A. Dougherty, 38 SEC 82 (1957) (SEC investigation of political contributions).
24. James T. DeWitt, 38 SEC 879 (1959).
25. Sal M. Alpher, 39 SEC 346 (1959). See Kemp, Disciplinary Proceedings by the S.E. C
Against Attorneys, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 23, 27-32 (1965); Comment, SEC Disciplinary Rules
and the Federal Securities Laws: The Regulation, Role and Responsibilities ofthe Attorney, 1972
DUKE LJ. 969, 983.
26. See, e.g., Marshall I. Stewart, Securities Act Release No. 4829 (Apr. 29, 1966); Ronald
H. Freemond, Securities Act Release No. 4736 (Oct. 9, 1964); Erwin Pincus, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6419 (June 27, 1963).
27. See Securities Act Release No. 5088, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
~77,913 (Sept. 24, 1970) (adding rule 2(e)(l)(iii)).
28. Klein, The SEC and The Legal Profession: Material Adverse Developments, 9 ELEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 612 (Practicing Law Inst. No. 319
1979) (reporting 43 rule 2(e) proceedings against attorneys between 1970 and 1979).
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vent their clients' securities violations.29 In one of these cases, the
Commission disciplined a law firm for failing to investigate suffi·ciently to discover that its partner, former partner, and a client had
filed inaccurate and incomplete information, and required the firm
to adopt internal procedures that would ensure full disclosure. 30 In
these and other cases, the Commission has used its disciplinary proceedings not so much to assess professional fitness as to conscript
lawyers to prevent violations.
There are various reasons for this new and expanded use of rule
2(e) proceedings. The Commission has limited staff and resources
available to devote to securities law enforcement,31 and along with
private plaintiffs, it has suffered declining success in enforcing the
laws in the courts.32 By relying on intra-agency disciplinary proceedings rather than civil litigation, the Commission remedies both
of these problems: it can apply its own standards to define miscon29. See, e.g., Lloyd Feld, Securities Act Release No. 11,775 (Oct. 30, 1975); Jo M. Ferguson, Securities Act Release No. 5523 (Aug. 21, 1974).
30. Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,982, 17 SEC
DOCKET 1149 {July 2, 1979).

31. See Emanuel Fields, 45 SEC 262 (1973), qffd, 495 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1974), where
the Commission stated:
Members of this Commission have pointed out time and time again that the task of enforcing the securities laws rests in overwhelming measure on the bar's shoulders. These
were statements of what all who are versed in the practicalities of securities law know to
be a truism, ie., that this Commission with its small staff, limited resources, and onerous
tasks is peculiarly dependent on the probity and diligence of the professionals who practice before it . . . [U]nscrupulous lawyers can inflict irreparable harm on those who rely
on the disclosure documents they produce. Hence we are under a duty to hold our bar to
appropriately rigorous standards of professional honor.
45 SEC at 266 n.20.
32. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Supreme Court held that
plaintiffs must prove scienter to succeed in private damage actions under rule lOb-5. Fearing
that the courts would extend Hochfelder to SEC suits seeking civil injunctions, the Commission turned to rule 2(e) proceedings, where it decided what level of intent is prerequisite to a
violation. Analyzing the effect of Hochfelder on injunctive actions, the General Counsel observed: "[I)t may be appropriate for the Commission to place greater reliance upon Rule 2(e)
in the future as a means of preventing a recurrence of unethical or improper conduct." Memorandum to Chairman Hills (June 8, 1976), Staff Study, Senate Subcomm. on Reports, Accounting and Management, App. I, at 1472 n.2 (1976), reprinted in Miller, The .Distortion and Misuse
of Rule 2(e), 1 SEC. REo. L.J. 54, 63 (1979). In a subsequent memorandum, the General
Counsel stated:
There may be cases where, as a consequence of Hochfelder, negligent conduct by an accountant or attome)' which injured investors may not constitute a violation of section
lO(b) and Rule 101).:5, nor otherwise violate the securities law, yet represent a substantial
threat to the public interest if such conduct were to continue in the future. If this conduct
would amount to a significant deviation from professional standards, a proceeding under
Rule 2(e) to test the individual's fitness to continue to be permitted to practice before the
Commission might be appropriate.
SEC Office Memorandum (Aug. 27, 1976), Staff Study, Senate Subcomm. on Reports, Accounting, and Management, App. I, at 1508 (1976), reprinted in Miller, supra, at 64.
The Supreme Court later held in Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), that scienter is an
element of a violation of§ lO(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and§ 17(a){l) of
the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q{a)(l) (1976), but not of§§ 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the 1933 Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a)(2) and 77q(a)(3) (1976).
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duct under the securities laws, and its staff can rely more heavily on
the bar to enforce the laws because of the increased threat of disciplinary action. A former Commission chairman acknowledged the enforcement purpose of rule 2(e) in public speeches,33 even as the
Commission denied such a purpose in litigation contesting its disciplinary powers. 34
That litigation is becoming more common as attorneys and commentators begin to recognize the implications of the SEC's new approach to attorney discipline.35 Two effects of the SEC's approach
are particularly disturbing. First, SEC proceedings against attorneys
may undermine the adversary system and the client's right to effective counsel. According to the Code of Professional Responsibility
the lawyer must "represent his client zealously within the bounds of
the law."36 This duty guarantees to clients in civil cases what the
sixth amendment guarantees in criminal proceedings: the right to
have the "effective assistance of counsel."37 The right to effective
counsel arises from the unique role that lawyers play in the adversary system.38 To protect this right, the Supreme Court has long prohibited unreasonable intrusions into the adversary system39 and
protected the Bar's independence.40
33. See Speech by Chairman Garret, Professional Responsibility and the Securities Laws,
State Bar of Texas (July 4, 1974), reprinted in Cheek, Professional Responsibility and Se!f-Regulation ofthe Securities Lawyer, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 597, 600 n.9 (1975):
In fact, any well organized scheme of violation almost surely involves cooperative participation by such professions [lawyers and accountants]. Simply as a matter of enforcement
technique, ifwe can induce the professionals to be less cooperative, we will prevent many
violations that would otherwise occur. And what are the available means to bring this
about? Exhortation, injunctive actions and Rule 2(e) disbarment proceedings. The Commission has adopted a conscious program to improve professional performance by the use
of these means. Even if certain businessmen are not moved to fear compliance by ethical
considerations or the fear of punishment, they will do far less damage if their lawyers and
accountants won't play. This is our policy objective. But, of course, we must seek it only
through already supportable means as provided by law.
34. See note 114 infra and accompanying text.
35. See Comment, supra note 25, at 985.
36. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-1.
37. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942).
38. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979).
39. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring): "[A]
common law trial is and always should be an adversary proceeding. Discovery was hardly
intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions either without wits or on wits
borrowed from the adversary."
40. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957). The Court stated: "A bar composed
of lawyers of good character is a worthy objective but it is unnecessary to sacrifice vital freedoins m order to obtain that goal. It is also important both to society and the bar itself that
lawyers be unintimidated - free to think, speak, and act as members of an Independent Bar."
353 U.S. at 273 (footnote oinitted). q: Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405-07 (1956).
In Cammer, the Court held that a lawyer is not the kind of"officer'' who can be tried summarily under 18 U.S.C. § 401(2), which empowers federal courts to punish "[m]isbehavior of any
of its officers in their official transactions." 350 U.S. at 399-400 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 401(2)).
The Court relied on legislative history indicating that Congress opposed use of the contempt
sanction against attorneys because they viewed it as a threat to the independence of the bar.
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Subject to discipline by an adversary, the lawyer may become
less willing to represent clients vigorously. Ordinarily, the lawyer
states the position most favorable to his client as long as he believes
there is a reasonable basis for that position.41 But securities practice
requires judgments on difficult legal questions in areas where the law
offers uncertain guidance.42 If a lawyer believes that he will be subject to suspension or debarment if he fails to discover and prevent
violations in these uncertain areas, he can hardly be expected to represent his client's interest with the same zeal, particularly when advocating debatable positions.43 Instead, he may limit his advice to
conservative interpretation of the law, especially prior to litigation,
when the SEC views the attorney's adversarial role as professionally
irresponsible.44
Second, rule 2(e) threatens the balance between state and federal
law by federalizing professional responsibility. In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Greene, the Supreme Court refused to extend rule 1Ob-5
41. Cf. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 314 (1965) (describing
advocacy of lawyers in tax field).
42. Consider such deliberately imprecise concepts in laws administered by the SEC as
"materiality," "control," "adequate disclosure," "average prudent man," "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance," and "untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances in
which they were made, not misleading." Statement of Policy Adopted by American Bar Association Regarding Responsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers in Advising with Respect to the
Compliance by Clients with Laws Administered by the Securities and Exchange Co=ission,
31 Bus. LAW. 543, 546 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ABA Report].
43. The American Bar Association has noted that:
Efforts by the government to impose responsibility upon lawyers to assure the quality of
their clients' compliance with the law or to compel lawyers to give advice resolving all
doubts in favor of regulatory restrictions would evoke serious and far-reaching disruption
in the role of lawyer as counselor, which would be detrimental to the public, clients, and
the legal profession.
ABA Report, supra note 42, at 545.
The SEC has repeatedly argued that "simple mistakes in judgment" would not subject the
lawyer to discipline. See, e.g., Garrett, New .Directions in Professional Responsiln1ity, 29 Bus.
LAW. 7, 12-13 (Spec. ed. Mar. 1974); Sonde, Professional Responsibility-A New Religion, or
the Old Gospel?, 24 EMORY L.J. 827, 849 (1975). Nevertheless, the SEC's chairman has acknowledged that the Commission uses "overly crude weapons" to intimidate lawyers. Garrett,
supra, at 12-13; Freedman, A Civil Libertarian Looks al Securities Regulation, 35 OHIO ST. L.J.
280, 285 (1974). In one case, an attorney who was vigorously advocating his client's rights was
advised to "take a look at the National Student Marketing complaint," in which attorneys
were named as defendants. Garrett, supra, at 10.
44. Daley & Karmel, Allomeys' Responsibilities: Adversaries al the Bar of lhe SEC, 24
EMORY L.J. 747, 765-67 (1975). The SEC has rationalized its position against the adversary
system by distinguishing the lawyer's adversarial and advisory roles. Commissioner So=er
has stated:
There is a difference between an advisor and an advocate. An advocate deals with the
past and he deals with the past conduct of his client when that conduct is questioned in
court. On the other hand the lawyer is serving as an advisor in looking to the future.
Id. at 765 n.88 (quoting So=er, Lawyers- Where .Does Responsibility Fall in Cases ofPrivate
Placement?, COM. & FINANCIAL CHRONICLE, July 8, 1974, at 7.). A strong argument can be
made, however, that the attorney's duty to act as an adversary arises from the first contact with
the SEC. Id. at 765-67.
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to conduct traditionally left to state regulation, absent a clear indication of congressional intent.45 Like corporation law in Santa Fe Industries, professional responsibility has traditionally arisen from
state common law.46 Rule 2(e) may override established state policies; SEC decisions and pronouncements indicate that the Commission is willing independently to define the requirements of the norms
of professional responsibility. 47 The courts should be reluctant to
imply such a derogation of the state law of professional responsibility.
Despite these.objections to the Commission's use of rule 2(e), the
courts and the Commission have not questioned the SEC's authority
to discipline attorneys. In one recent case, Touche Ross & Co. v.
SEC,48 Judge Timbers of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Commission's authority to discipline accountants under rule
2(e). Broad dicta suggest that the opinion applies to attorneys as
well. Judge Timbers stated that SEC disciplinary proceedings
against accountants and attorneys could be implied from the Commission's general rulemaking authority. The general rulemaking
provision, he reasoned, vested the SEC with broad authority to "protect investors against fraud or deception made possible by constantly
changing conditions."49 He concluded that disciplinary proceedings
promote this purpose of ensuring "full disclosur~ of material information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce." 50
The SEC has enthusiastically endorsed the Second Circuit's
broad interpretation of its rulemaking authority. In William R
Carter, 51 the Commission reversed an administrative law judge's
controversial decision to suspend temporarily two attorneys under
rule 2(e). The attorneys had aided and abetted a securities law viola45. 430 U.S. 462, 478-80 (1977). The Court stated that while "there may well be a need for
uniform federal fiduciary standards to govern mergers . . . . those standards should not be
supplied by judicial extension of§ lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 to 'cover the corporate universe.'"
430 U.S. at 479-80 (citation omitted). See also Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959), in
which the Court stated that: ''Without explicit action by lawmakers, decisions of great constitutional import and effect would be relegated by default to administrators who, under our
system of government, are not endowed with authority to decide them." 360 U.S. at 507. The
Court added that such decisions require "careful and purposeful considerations by those responsible for enacting and implementing our laws." 360 U.S. at 507.
46. Daley & Karmel, supra note 44, at 749.
41. See William R. Carter, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC DOCKET
292, 322-23 (Feb. 28, 1981). q: Gruenbaum, Clients' Frauds and Their Lawyers' Obligations:
A Response to Professor Kramer, 68 GEO. L.J. 191, 201 (1979) (arguing that the SEC disciplines lawyers who would not be subject to discipline under the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility).
48. 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979).
49. 609 F.2d at 580 (quoting R.A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 299 F.2d 127, 132 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 911 (1962)).
50. 609 F.2d at 580 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976)).
51. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC DocKET 319 (Feb. 28, 1981).
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tion by failing to ensure that their recalcitrant client disclosed material facts. 52 Although the Commission rejected the administrative
law judge's interpretation of rule 2(e) - an interpretation that would
have required attorneys to act in situations where the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility left conduct to attorney discretion53 - it
nevertheless asserted that it had broad power to discipline attorneys
who failed to comply with "generally recognized norms of professional conduct."54 The Commission's decision clearly indicates that
it will continue to define what those norms require in the securities
context. The Commission emphatically rejected this challenge to its
authority to promulgate rule 2(e).55
The foundations of SEC authority to discipline attorneys may
not be as solid as the Second Circuit and the Commission assume.
The general rulemaking provisions are subject to a narrower interpretation, and the cases cited by Judge Timbers can be plausibly distinguished. Given the troublesome policy implications of recent rule
2(e) enforcement, a reexamination of the SEC's authority to promulgate the rule seems long overdue.
II. RULE 2(e) AND THE SEC's GENERAL
RULEMAKING AUTHORITY

Although attorneys are integrally involved in the marketing and
sale of securities,56 only three isolated provisions of the six principal
federal securities laws mentioned lawyers. 57 No provision indicates
that Congress contemplated administrative disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers. To justify rule 2(e) proceedings, the SEC has therefore relied on provisions in each of the securities laws that authorize
the Commission to promulgate "such rules and regulations as may
be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this title."58 From these general rulemaking provisions, proponents of rule
2(e) have constructed three distinct justifications for the rule. First,.
they have argued that because these provisions give the Commission
authority to prescribe the procedures by which its business will be
conducted, they also give the Commission the inherent authority to
discipline attorneys who fail to comply with those procedures. Second, they assert that rule 2(e) proceedings are "necessary and appro52. See note 5 supra.
53. See Marsh, supra note 4, at 996.
54. 22 SEC DOCKET at 319.
55. 22 SEC DOCKET 294.
56. While the statutory role of securities lawyers seems minimal, their practical role is
significant Securities lawyers are often involved in disclosure decisions on a day-to-day basis;
they draft, revise, and comment on disclosure documents, and file them with the Commission.
22 SEC DOCKET 321.
51. See note 18 supra.
58. See William R. Carter, 22 SEC DocKET at 296 n.13; Marsh, supra note 4, at 1005.
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priate" because they promote the statutory objective of adequate
disclosure to investors. Finally, they argue that however weak the
justifications based on general rulemaking provisions may be, congressional reenactment of those provisions indicates legislative approval of rule 2(e). As the analysis below indicates, each of these
justifications is flawed.
A. Inherent Authority

The SEC has asserted that it has "inherent" power to discipline
attorneys who fail to comply with the rules and procedures that it
has legitimately promulgated pursuant to its general rulemaking authority.59 Judge Timbers endorsed this reasoning in Touche Ross:
"Rule 2(e) thus represents an attempt by the SEC essentially to protect the integrity of its own processes."60 To support this "inherent
authority" argument, both Judge Timbers and the Commission61
cited a series of judicial decisions rejecting challenges to the disciplinary authority of other agencies. The inherent authority argument
collapses after a careful examination of those cases.
The Touche Ross opinion cited three cases upholding inherent
agency authority to discipline attorneys. In Goldsmith v. Board of
Tax Appeals,62 the Supreme Court indicated that this "quasi-judicial" agency had authority to "limit those who appear before it to
represent the interest of tax-payers."63 In Herman v. .Dulles,64 the
District of Columbia Circuit upheld the authority of the International Claims Commission to revoke an attorney's right to practice
before it. And in Koden v. United States .Department ofJustice, 65 the
Seventh Circuit held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Board of Immigration Appeals could debar attorneys.
The plaintiff in Touche Ross attempted to distinguish these cases by
emphasizing that the agencies involved exercised only judicial functions, while the SEC is primarily an administrative and regulatory
agency. Judge Timbers rejected the distinction, implying that the
nature of an agency's functions does not determine whether it can
discipline attorneys.66
Assuming that Judge Timbers's conclusion is correct, one is left
to wonder why the Supreme Court in Goldsmith relied so heavily on
59. See Marsh, supra note 4, at 1009.
60. Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 581 (2d Cir. 1979).
61. William R. Carter, 22 SEC DOCKET 294 n.5.
62. 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
63. 270 U.S. at 121. The Board was authorized to make "rules of evidence and procedure"
for its proceedings. 270 U.S. at 121.
64. 205 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
65. 564 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1977).
66. 609 F.2d at 581.
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the "quasi-judicial'' duties of the Board of Tax Appeals in upholding
its disciplinary authority. 67 There is a logical explanation: a "quasijudicial" agency resembles a court, and a court has inherent authority to discipline lawyers as a corollary to its power to admit attorneys
to practice before it. 68 This suggests that the agencies in Goldsmith,
Herman, and Koden had authority to discipline attorneys not only
because their functions were "quasi-judicial," but also because they
had authority to admit attorneys to practice before them. Indeed,
each of these decisions assumes that the agency possesses authority
to admit attorneys to practice, and then implies the corollary authority to debar.
This interpretation of the inherent authority cases suggests a
plausible distinction between the SEC and the "quasi-judicial" agencies. Congress never intended to give the SEC power to admit attorneys. Proponents of the Securities Act considered a provision that
would have enabled the Commission to "approve" attorneys before
"accept[ing] their statements," but rejected it because it ''would put a
discretion in the hands of the Commission that mi~ht be dangerous."69 And in 1965, Congress amended the Admimstrative Procedure Act to bar the SEC and most other agencies from imposing
admission requirements for licensed attoraeys.70 Absent authority to
admit attorneys, the SEC's inherent authority to discipline them cannot follow as a corollary.

B. Implied Authority
The second justification for rule 2(e) is based squarely on the language of the general rulemaking provisions: the SEC may discipline
attorneys, it is asserted, because such a task is "necessary or appropriate" to implement the securities laws.71 This argument rests on a
67. The Supreme Court in Goldsmith noted the "quasi-judicial" nature of the Board of Tax
Appeals's duties and pointed out that most executive departments "in which interests of individuals as claimants or tax-payers are to be passed on by executive officers or boards" exercise
authority to limit those who act for them. 270 U.S. at 121.
68. See Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 605 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 905 (1977), overruled on other grounds, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 612 F.2d
377 (8th Cir.), vacated, 101 S. Ct. 669 (1981); Schloetter v. Railoc, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th
Cir. 1976); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975).
69. Securities Act: Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 248 (1933) (statement of Ollie M. Butler).
70. H.R. REP. No. 1141, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CoNo. &
Ao. NEWS 4170, 4170-71. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500(b) (1976):
An individual who is a member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a State
may represent a person before an agency on filing with the agency a written declaration
that he is currently qualified as provided by this subsection and is authorized to represent
the particular person in whose behalf he acts.
11. See Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 582 (1979); William R. Carter, Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC DOCKET 292, 294-95 (Feb. 28, 1981).
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broad and arguably incorrect interpretation of the scope of general
rulemaking provisions.
Lacking more specific indications of congressional intent in statutes or legislative history, courts have construed general.rulemaking
provisions to uphold agency discretion if that discretion does not undermine statutory goals. Some courts recognized that Congress
could neither list every evil it sought to :proscribe72 nor catalogue
every strategem for circumventing the policies of legislation;73 they
reasoned that Congress impliedly .authorized rules meeting unforeseen conditions or promoting statutory objectives.74 Other courts
upheld rules that responded to technical or complex problems out of
deference to an agency's special expertise.75 The courts have thus
sustained discretionary rulemaking when it responded to unforeseen
or unforeseeable conditions, utilized agency expertise, or promoted
the statutory purpose. They have often stated the test in the shorthand of Mourning v. Family Publications Services, Inc. : a rule is authorized if it is " 'reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling
legislation.' " 76
Nevertheless, courts construe general rulemaking provisions
more narrowly than Mourning or proponents of rule 2(e) suggest.
FCC v. Midwest J/ideo Corp. 77 limited the Mourning test when it
held that agency rules do not "reasonably relate" to legislative objectives if they conflict with the statutory scheme.78 In Midwest J/ideo,
the Supreme Court struck down Federal Communications Commission rules requiring certain cable television systems to develop
greater channel capacity and make channels available to public, educational, local government, and leased-access users. The FCC argued that its rules reasonably related to such statutory purposes as
72. See Mourning v. Family Publications Servs., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 372 (1973) (quoting
American Trucking Assns. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 309-10 (1953)).
73. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941) (Congress could not catalogue all the devices and strategems for circumventing·the Act nor the whole gamut of remedies to effectuate those policies in the variety of specific situations).
74. E.g., Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969) (foonote omitted) (ruJe requiring housing authorities to explain why they are evicting a tenant who lacks the financial means
of providing a decent home without government aid furthers specific purpose of housing acts
to provide "a decent home and a suitable environment for every American family." See generally Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940) ("Delegation by Congress has long been recognized as necessary in order that the exertion oflegislative power does
not become a futility."); S. REP. No. 960, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1928) (describing reason it
delegates power); H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1928).
75. Mourning v. Family Publications Servs., Inc., 411 U.S. at 371-72; FCC v. Schreiber,
381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965) (relying on familiarity of administrative agencies with the industries
they regulate); American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. United States, 344 U.S. at 310 (citing familiarity of agencies with industry conditions).
76. 411 U.S. at 369 (quoting Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969)).
77. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
78. 440 U.S. at 708.
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"increasing outlets for local self-expression and augmenting the public's choice of programs."79 Justice White rejected the Commission's
insistence that the obligation imposed by the rules was "immaterial"
so long as they promoted statutory objectives. 80 He voided the rules
because of "strong indications [in the statute] that agency flexibility
was to be sharply delimited." 81 Read together, Mourning and Midwest Video construe general rulemaking provisions to authorize rules
that respond to unforeseen or unforeseeable conditions, utilize
agency expertise, or promote legislative objectives, but preclude implying authority that would conflict with the statutory scheme. SEC
authority to discipline attorneys dissipates when rule 2(e) is subjected to this more complex four-part test.
Proponents of rule 2(e) might first argue that the rule responds to
an abuse unforeseen by Congress when it enacted the securities laws:
attorney misconduct in violation of SEC rules or procedures. Inde'ed, Judge Timbers alluded to such an argument in Touche Ross. 82
The argument is untenable, however, because Congress was well
aware of attorney misconduct both when it enacted the 1933 and
1934 Acts and when it approved subsequent amendments. The press
had noted the indispensability of lawyers to securities frauds long
before 1934.83 During this period the public regarded lawyers as the
mercenaries of shady entrepreneurs who indifferently lent their expertise to all sorts of wrongdoing. 84 And both Justice Stone85 and
Professor (later Justice) Douglas86 published articles in 1934 expres79. 440 U.S. at 694-95 (citation omitted).
80. 440 U.S. at 702.
81. 440 U.S. at 708.
82. See Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 580-81 (2d Cir. 1979).
83. But just as a fine, natural football player needs coaching in the fundamentals and
schooling in the wiles of the sport, so, too, it takes a corporation lawyer with a heart for
the game to organize a great stock swindle or income tax dodge and drill the financiers in
all the precise details of their play.
Otherwise, in their natural enthusiasm to rush in and grab everything that happens not
to be nailed down and guarded with shotguns, they would soon be caught off-side and
penalized, and some of ihe noted financiers who are now immortalized as all-time allAmerica larcenists never would have risen beyond the level of the petty thief or shortchange man.
Pegler, N.Y. World Telegram, Jan. 24, 1923, at 19, quoted in Douglas, Directors Who IJo Nol
Direct, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1329 n.65 (1934).
84. Sommer, supra note 18, at 100.
85. See Stone, The Public I'!fluence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1934) (reprinting
speech that castigated corporate lawyers for their lack of concern for the public interest).
86. See Douglas, supra note 83, at 1329 (footnote omitted):
This lack of social mindedness has not been wholly or largely that of business. It has been
equally shared by lawyers. It has been evidenced by the almost perverted singleness of
purpose with which they have championed the cause of their clients, whether it be in the
drafting of a deposit agreement, the handling of a merger, the conduct of a reorganization,
or the marketing of securities. It resulted in getting accomplished what clients wanted but
without regard for the long-term consequences of those accomplishments.
See also Sommer, supra note 18, at 100-01 (quoting speech by Prof. Douglas in 1934):
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sing concern over financial misconduct by attorneys. 87 Attorney
misconduct was therefore quite foreseeable; by not specifying attorneys among those subject to SEC discipline or regulation, Congress
apparently intended to leave attorney discipline to courts and bar
associations.
The Commission might next assert, as it did in William R Carter,
that rule 2(e) falls within an area of the SEC's expertise because it
regulates "securities lawyers performing disclosure-related professional services." 88 Such an argument is misleading, however, because rule 2(e) governs not disclosure, but professional
responsibility. 89 As the District of Columbia Circuit once observed
in a case reversing a rule 2(e) suspension: ''This disbarment case
involves a lawyer's reputation in the community, his livelihood, his
self-esteem - his 'right.' It is not concerned with some speciality
developed in the administration of the Act entrusted to the
Agency." 90 Admittedly, what professional ethics require in a given
situation depends in some measure on the relevant substantive law,
and no authority is more expert in securities law than the SEC. 91
But because courts and bar associations have great experience in
punishing attorney misconduct in situations involving a host of complex state and federal statutes, deference to agency expertise in the
securities context seems unnecessary.
It is sad but true that the high priest [sic] of the legal profession were active agents in
making high finance a master rather than a servant of the public interest. They accomplished what their clients wanted accomplished and they did it efficiently, effectively, and
with dispatch. They were tools or agenctes for the manufacture of synthetic securities and
for the manipulation and appropriation of other people's money. In doing this they followed the tradition of the guild. In fact, they were applying the teachings of their professors. They never took seriously the true nature of their public trust. They failed to act as
conditioners of their clients' programs. They neglected their foremost function - to create and maintain financial practices that were respectable, honest and conservative.
87. Neither advocated SEC regulation oflawyers. Justice Stone, despite his assertion that
the Bar bore some responsibility for evils of the stock market, Stone, supra note 85, at 9,
continued to believe in attorney self-regulation:
[W]e can continue to look to the Bar for the preservation and development of American
institutions. . . . It will realize that expectation . . . through the growing influence of the
law schools, whose character . . . determines the character of the legal profession; [and]
through closer association and cooperation of this and other schools oflaw with the Bar in
the worthy tasks of building up a new morale in the profession, fitted to the new conditions under which it must do its work.
Id. at 14.
88. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC DocKET 292,296 (Feb. 28, 1981).
89. Rule 2(e) on its face governs suspension or disbarment of attorneys who do not possess
the requisite qualifications to represent others, lack character or integrity, engage in unethical
or improper professional conduct, or willfully violate or aid and abet violations of the securities laws. Only the last ground for discipline seems to fall partially within the SEC's expertise;
the other grounds are entirely matters of professional responsibility.
90. Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d 956, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
91. As the agency whose concern is compliance with the securities laws, the SEC does have
expertise regarding violations. It could thus claim implied authority to discipline attorneys
who under rule 2(e)(ili) have violated or aided and abetted violations of the securities laws,
were it not for the statutory scheme which implies that the SEC has no such authority.
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Both Touche Ross and William R Carter relied heavily on the
third element of the Mourning-Midwest Video test to justify rule 2(e).
Judge Timbers asserted that the rule was reasonably related to the
principal purpose of the 1933 Act, which was "to provide investors
with full disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce." 92 According to the court, breaches
of professional responsibility can inflict great damage on investors. 93
It added that the Commission, with limited resources and a small
staff, must rely for enforcement on professionals who appear and
practice before it.94 Because competent and ethical attorneys promote that enforcement, the court reasoned, rule 2(e) furthers the disclosure policy of the securities laws. 95
Judge Timbers seems correct in assuming that attorneys who are
subject to disciplinary proceedings under rule 2(e) are more likely to
disclose material facts that their clients have revealed to them. But it
would be unrealistic to assume that clients will continue to confide as
readily in attorneys who are subject to independent ethical obligations to encourage disclosure and to disclose themselves. 96 As the
Commission itself recently acknowledged, "[l]awyers who are seen
by their clients as being motivated by fears for their personal liability
will not be consulted on difficult issues." 97
Even if rule 2(e) does promote disclosure or some other legiti92. Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 580 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976)).
93. 609 F.2d at 581. The Court quoted United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 953 (1964): "In our complex society the accountant's certificates
and the lawyer's opinion can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the
chisel or the crowbar."
94. The court thus agreed with the Commission's frequent assertion that its small staff and
limited resources justify the saddling of enforcement responsibilities on professionals. 609
F.2d at 580-81. See, e.g., Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 15,982, 17 SEC DOCKET ll49, ll62 (July 2, 1979) (Karmel, Commr., dissenting). See also
Address by SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams before the Section of Corporation, Banking
and Business Law of the ABA (Aug. 1980), reprinted in SEC. REo. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 566,
Aug. 13, 1980, at H-1.
·
95. 609 F.2d at 581.
96. Mandatory attorney disclosure of client misconduct would destroy the confidential relationship between lawyer and client, without which the attorney's success in securing compliance with the law could not succeed. Without the lawyer's strict ethical duty not to reveal
client confidences, clients will not reveal those confidences even to the lawyers who could
otherwise persuade them to pursue their interests legally. See Note, The Allorney-Cllent Privilege After Allorney .Disclosure, 18 MICH. L. REv. 927, 934 (1980). Because disclosure documents can be prepared by intelligent laymen, clients may also dispense with other services,
narrowing the attorney's role to rendering legal opinions. See Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant
Police Force: A New Rolefor Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437,468 (1974). They may tum to
paraprofessionals and other nonlegal assistants who are not bound by professional rules that
require them to reveal their employer's fraud. This loss of the lawyer's expertise in preparing
disclosure documents as well as counseling to secure compliance with legal obligations may
prevent adequate disclosures to investors.
97. William R. Carter, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC DOCKET 292,
316-17 (Feb. 28, 1981).
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mate statutory purpose, its validity cannot rest on that virtue alone.
Under Midwest Video, the rule would still be unauthorized if it contravened the statutory scheme of the securities laws. 98 And in fact,
rule 2(e) seems inconsistent in two respects with "the pattern of the
statute[s] taken as a whole."99 First, the conspicuous absence of provisions authorizing the Commission to discipline or regulate attorneys, coupled with provisions authorizing discipline or regulation of
virtually every other business and profession in the securities industry, suggests that Congress did not contemplate SEC regulation of
the bar. Second, rule 2(e) proceedings undermine the district courts'
statutory jurisdiction over attorney misconduct.
The abundance of regulatory and disciplinary provisions in the
securities laws suggests that Congress did not intend the Commission
to discipline attorneys. Congress has expressly authorized the SEC
to discipline members of a variety of professions in the securities
industry, including members and officers of n~tional securities exchanges, 100 brokers and dealers, 101 registered investment advisors, 102
persons "associated" with a broker or dealer, 103 and municipal securities dealers. 104 Congress has also expressly authorized the Commission to regulate almost every business and profession in the
industry, including accountants. 105 But Congress has been selective
98. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 708 (1979).
99. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121 (1978). See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 ,
(1975) ("In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.") (citations
omitted).
100. Section 19(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1976), authorizes the SEC to suspend
or expel members or officers of national securities exchanges.
101. In 1936, Congress authorized the SEC to revoke the registration of brokers and dealers. Act of May 27, 1936, ch. 462, § 3, 49 Stat. 1337 (1936) (current version codified at 15
U.S.C. § 780) (1976 & Supp. I 1977).
102. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 203(e)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 806-3(e)(4) (1976), expressly authorized the Commission to impose administrative sanctions on registered investment advisors.
103. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3013, 3034-35.
104. The Securities Act Amendments of 1975 authorized SEC proceedings against municipal securities dealers. Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 13, .89 Stat.
131 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 780-4 (1976)).
·
105. See Klein, supra note 28, at 600. See generally§ 3(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c
(1976) (listing and defining entities and persons regulated by the SEC).
Section 19(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a)(l976), provides for SEC
promulgation of accounting standards. This provision distinguishes rule 2(e) discipline of accountants from discipline oflawyers. Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 15,982, 17 SEC DOCKET 1149, 1158 (July 2, 1979) (Karmel, Commr., dissenting).
In addition to persons subject to SEC discipline, the list of persons and entities subject to SEC
regulation includes: accountants, see note 20 supra; issuers and persons controlling or controlled by issuers, Securities Act of 1933, § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1976); national securities
exchanges, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976); persons who solicit, or
permit the use of their name to solicit, proxies, consents, or authorizations in respect of registered securities, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976); brokers' and
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in expanding the Commission's disciplinary and regulatory authority. It resisted a Commission plea to extend section 15 of the 1934
Act to allow proceedings against all "associated persons." 106 This
pattern suggests that when Congress desires to give the SEC authority to discipline or regulate a particular group of people, it expressly
provides that authority. Indeed, Congress has endorsed a District of
Columbia Circuit opinion that reached this conclusion. 107 Since
none of the isolated references to lawyers in the original securities
legislation or in subsequent amendments indicates that Congress
contemplated SEC regulation or discipline of the bar, 108 rule 2(e)
undermines the statutory scheme.
Rule 2(e) also conflicts with the pattern of the securities statutes
by shifting the authority to adjudicate violations from the district
courts to the SEC. Section 22 of the 1933 Act provides that the "district courts ... shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations [of
this Act] . . . and, concurrent with State and Territorial courts, of all
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or
duty created by this [Act]." 109 Section 27 of the 1934 Act grants to
the district courts "exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this
[Act]," 110 but, like the 1933 Act's jurisdiction provision, does not create concurrent SEC jurisdiction. The SEC's only express authorization to enforce the securities laws against a person not registered
with the Commission is to seek injunctive relief in the federal district
courts. 111 Thus Congress has given the courts, and not the SEC, jurisdiction over enforcement actions.
Rule 2(e) proceedings undermine the district court's jurisdiction
because the SEC uses them to reach the same conduct that it can
dealers' associations, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1976); and clearing agencies, 15 U.S.C. § 78q-l
(1976)).
106. See Klein, supra note 28, at 642.
107. The D.C. Circuit concluded that Congr~ expressly provided disciplinary or regulatory authority to the SEC when it so intended. Wallach v. SEC, 202 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
In Wallach, the Court held that the SEC could not join persons controlled by a broker-dealer
in a revocation proceeding under the statute that then provided for discipline only of brokers
and dealers. 202 F.2d at 463. In extending SEC disciplinary authority to persons associated
with a broker or dealer, the 1964 Congress endorsed Wallach's reasoning. See H.R. REP, No.
1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 3013,
3034-35. For an attempt to distinguish Wallach,see Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570,
580 n.16 (2d Cir. 1979).
108. See note 18 supra.
109. 1933 Act, § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1976).
110. 1934 Act, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
111. Section 2l(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(d) (1976) provides:
[W]henever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or is about to
engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of this chapter • . • it may in its discretion bring an action in the proper district court of the United States . . . to enjoin such
acts or _practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or
restrainmg order shall tie granted . . . .
Section 20(b) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976) is substantially the same.
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reach through enforcement proceedings in the courts. This is most
obvious where the rule 2(e) proceeding is grounded on a finding that
the lawyer ''willfully violated" or ''willfully aided and abetted" a violation of the securities laws. Proceedings based on "improper professional conduct" also rely on violations insofar as such conduct
consists of failing to prevent a client's violation. 112 Furthermore, the
Commission has often grounded its rule 2(e) proceedings on conduct
that is the subject of its parallel district court injunctive actions
against others. 113 The SEC thus reaches the same activity in rule
2(e) administrative proceedings as Congress intended it to reach in
injunctive suits in courts.
The SEC has argued that rule 2(e) proceedings are distinguishable from enforcement actions; the former, it claims, assess the lawyer's fitness to practice securities law, while the latter pursue
enforcement as an end in itself. According to the Commission, rule
2(e) is intended, not to provide an additional eµforcement remedy,
but to address the lawyer's qualifications to represent others. 114 Such
an argument does not square with speeches by SEC Commissioners
that acknowledge the enforcement purpose of rule 2(e) prosecutions. m Nor is it consistent with the Commission's approach to rule
2(e) prosecutions, which is to use rule 2(e) to threaten the bar so that
it may rely on attorneys to enforce the securities laws. 116 The SEC's
argument therefore fails, and rule 2(e) proceedings remain in conflict
with the jurisdiction of the courts.
Because rule 2(e) fails the Mourning-Midwest Video tests, SEC
authority to discipline attorneys cannot be implied from the general
rulemaking provisions of the securities laws. The only remaining
justification for rule 2(e) lies in congressional intent in readopting
the general rulemaking provisions.
112. E.g., Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,982, 17
SEC DOCKET 1149 (July 2, 1979). The case relied on K.M. & K.'s knowledge of material
misstatements and omissions in its clients' filings with the Commission.
I 13. Klein, supra note 28, at 635. See, e.g., Keating, Muething & Klekamp, 17 SEC
1149. Virtually all of the remaining proceedings paralleled district court suits in
which the SEC had already obtained injunctions against the attorneys. Klein, supra note 28, at
635.
DOCKET

114. See Brief for Appellee at 34 n.50, Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir.
1979) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). In Securities Act Release No. 5088, at I (Sept.
24, 1970), the Commission stated that its provision for discipline of willful violators or willful
aiders and abettors:
is merely a clarification of Commission practice under the present Rule 2(e), which provides for the disqualification from appearance or practice before the Commission of any
person who the Commission finds . . . (i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to
represent others, or (ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct.
115. See notes 31 & 33 supra.
116. See note 31 supra.
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C. Authority by Congressional Rat!fication
Rule 2(e) was promulgated over forty years ago, and since that
time Congress has reenacted three times the general rulemaking provisions upon which the SEC rests its authority to discipline attorneys.117 The Commission might therefore argue that Congress has
ratified its construction of the rulemaking provisions - a construction that permits rule 2(e). The Commission could correctly point
out that courts often defer to agency constructions of statutes when
the construction is long-standing and consistent, 118 or when later
Congresses intended to adopt the agency's construction when the
statute was reenacted. 11 9
Nevertheless, the circumstances surrounding rule 2(e) suggest
that in this case the agency's construction deserves little weight, and
that later Congresses did not ratify the rule. This ratification argument fails for two reasons. First, the long time period during which
rule 2(e) has existed establishes little. An agency's long-standing
construction of its rulemaking authority carries little weight unless
accompanied by evidence of congressional intent to authorize the
regulation at issue. 120 The Commission presented no such evidence
when it promulgated rule 2(e). 121 Second, Congress can ratify an
agency's construction only if it considers that construction when it
reenacts a statute. 122 Contemporaneous construction "carries most
weight when the administrators participated in drafting and directly
made known their view to Congress in committee hearings." 123
Nothing indicates that later Congresses had rule 2(e) in mind when
they reenacted the general rulemaking provisions of the securities
laws. 124 Because rule 2(e) has been used extensively against attorneys only since the latest reenactment, 125 a general congressional
117. See amendments to 15 U.S.C. § 78w: Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L.
94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975); Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 10, 78 Stat. 88a (1964); Act of May 27, 1936,
§ 8, 49 Stat. 1379 (1936).
118. See United States v. National Assn. of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975); Saxbe
v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974).
119. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
120. See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 119 (1978) ("(A]n agency may not bootstrap itself
into an area in which it has no jurisdiction by repeatedly violating its statutory mandate.")
(quoting Federal Maritime Commn. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745 (1973)); Adamo
Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 287 n.5 (1978). Cf. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 n.18 (1979) ("(T]he language of the statute and not the [Commission's] rules must control") (citations omitted).
121. See SEC, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 45-46
(1935).
122. See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 193 n.28 (1969).
123. 396 U.S. at 192.
124. For the legislative histories of the 1975 and 1964 amendments, see (1975] U.S. Cool!
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 179; (1964] U.S. CODE CONG, & Ao. NEWS 3013.
125. See text at notes 21-28 supra. More than 58% of the rule 2(e) proceedings between
1950 and 1980 were brought after 1975. Marsh, supra note 4, at 988-89 (1980).
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awareness should not be presumed. 126 The SEC therefore cannot
justify rule 2(e) by reference to subsequent reenactments of its general rulemaking authority.
CONCLUSION

Attorneys should be disciplined when their practice of securities
law fails to conform to the highest standards of professional ethics.
But one could reasonably doubt whether rule 2(e) proceedings are
the best forum in which to define those standards and punish attorneys who fail to comply with them. Since there are alternative forums, and since the Securities and Exchange Commission lacks
authority to enforce rule 2(e) against attorneys, courts should void
sanctions imposed on attorneys in rule 2(e) proceedings. Until Congress indicates a contrary intent, only courts and bar associations, the
traditional sources of rules of professional responsibility, possess the
authority to discipline attorneys.
126. q: SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121 (1978) (courts should hesitate to presume congressional awareness of agency construction from a few isolated statements in thousands of
pages of legislative documents).

